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Dealing With Iran

The Iranian Nuclear Debate: More Myths
Than Facts
Christopher J. Bolan
Abstract: Much of the public debate surrounding US policies
regarding Iran has been distorted by myths that obscure the actual
status of Iranian nuclear programs. Similarly, discussions about the
implications of a nuclear-armed Iran are often built on questionable assumptions requiring more thorough examination. This article
dispels these myths, questions these assumptions, and draws important implications for US policymakers in this critical strategic debate.

I

nternational negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program are once
again in limbo. At the conclusion of the February talks in Almaty,
Kazakhstan, Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi characterized
them as a significant “milestone” that had reached a “turning point,” and
left him “very optimistic and hopeful.”1 Meanwhile, reactions from representatives of the so-called P5+1 (United States, Great Britain, France,
Russia, China, and Germany) were notably more measured, but hinted at
an optimistic assessment as newly confirmed US Secretary of State Kerry
characterized the February sessions as “useful.”2
As so frequently happened in the past, however, subsequent talks
in April crashed against the reality of significant gaps in the substantive
negotiating positions of the P5+1 and Iranian teams. The European
Union representative to the talks, Catherine Ashton, cast a decidedly
downbeat assessment of the April sessions observing that “the positions
of the [P5+1] and Iran remain far apart on the substance. . . . We have
therefore agreed that all sides will go back to capitals to evaluate where
we stand in the process.”3
This pause in negotiations offers American policymakers the opportunity to reassess strategic options regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The
recent election of Hasan Rouhani as President of Iran gives the Obama
administration another reason to reconsider America's current approach.
A coherent strategy requires the establishment of clear objectives and
a design for employing the nation’s instruments of power to achieve
those objectives. In the case of Iran, the overriding strategic objective
of current US policy has been made exactingly clear by President Obama
and Vice President Biden. In his speech to the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee one year ago, President Obama said the objective
of US policy is “to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”4
Vice President Biden reiterated this position nearly verbatim to the same
1     “Milestone Reached in Iran Nuclear Talks,” Reuters, February 28, 2013, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2013/02/28/us-iran-nuclear-minister-idUSBRE91R1JY20130228
2     Ibid.
3     “E3+3 Statement by EU HR Ashton Following Talks with Iran,” European Union @ United
Nations, April 6, 2013, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_13363_en.htm
4     Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at AIPAC Policy Conference,” The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC, March 4, 2012, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/04/remarks-president-aljac-policy-conference.
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audience on 4 March 2013 saying the goal of US policy is “to prevent
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”5 While others outside the White
House have suggested alternative US policy objectives ranging from
preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability to ousting
the current regime in Tehran, these statements by the President and Vice
President have effectively ended this portion of the strategic debate. US
policies under President Obama will be guided by the paramount objective of preventing Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon.
Nevertheless, the public and internal debates over how the United
States can best marshal its diplomatic, economic, informational, and
military instruments of power to accomplish this expressed policy
objective will continue for some time. The default option would be to
maintain the current US dual-track approach of offering negotiations
while imposing ever-tightening economic and financial sanctions in
the hope of compelling Iranian concessions on its nuclear program.
Others have made the case for preemptive military attacks designed to
destroy Iran’s existing nuclear facilities or facilitate a regime change in
Tehran.6 Still others have advocated a strategy emphasizing a diplomatic
approach exchanging United States and international recognition of
Iran’s right to enrich uranium in return for commitments from Tehran
to limit enrichment activities and subject them to an intrusive international inspection regimen ensuring nuclear materials are not diverted to
military purposes.7
It is the contention of this author that the quality of these public
and internal debates would be improved significantly by dispelling
some of the most misguided myths surrounding Iran and clarifying the
status of its current nuclear program. Additionally, this article examines
some of the more questionable assumptions about a nuclear-armed Iran
and offers some preliminary implications for US policymakers as they
struggle to implement a coherent strategic approach toward Iran.

Mythbusting
Myth 1: Iran is an irrational actor.
This myth is especially popular among those pushing for immediate
military action to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Their argument is
that Iranian leaders are crazed, hot-headed, and messianic actors who
do not respond to logic or reason; therefore, they cannot be negotiated with or trusted with weapons of mass destruction These claims
are based on cultural ignorance and prejudices that would be routinely
dismissed as out of bounds in virtually any context outside US policy
debates on Iran. Fortunately, several senior US and Israeli officials have
5     Joe Biden, “Remarks by the Vice President to the AIPAC Policy Conference,” The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC, March 4, 2013, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/04/remarks-vice-president-alpac-policy-conference.
6     See, for example, Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad
Option,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2012): 76-86.
7     See, for example, Dr. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Iran, the US and Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 5 (October 2012): 183-202; and also
William H. Luers and Thomas R. Pickering, “‘Nixon Option’ for Iran Could Break Stalemate,”
The Japan Times, June 5, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/06/05/commentary/
nixon-option-for-Iran-could-break-stalemate-allow-u-s-to-strengthen-security-without-war/.
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publicly dismissed this myth as false. America’s senior military officer,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey, asserted in a
television interview with Fareed Zakaria that “we are of the opinion that
the [Iranian] regime is a rational actor.”8 Israel’s retired Mossad director
Meir Dagan similarly opined that “the regime in Iran is a very rational
one.”9 Ehud Barak, Israel’s Defense Minister, in a meeting with senior
Obama administration officials elaborated on this basic point, stating
“I don’t think the Iranians, even if they got the bomb, [would] drop it
in the neighborhood. . . . They are radical but not totally crazy. . . . They
have a quite sophisticated decision-making process, and they understand
reality.”10 Moreover, the US Director of National Intelligence recently
confirmed the rational nature of the regime in Tehran judging that
“Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach.”11
Of course, even rational actors can make serious miscalculations
with horrific consequences (witness Saddam Hussein’s ill-advised invasion of Kuwait in 1990). This problem is exacerbated by the opacity of
the decisionmaking regime in Tehran. Nonetheless, recognizing leaders
in Tehran are rational actors has important policy implications: namely,
that a negotiated compromise settlement is at least theoretically possible
assuming a minimum degree of overlapping interests; and containment
and deterrence are viable strategies should Iran at some date decide to
acquire a nuclear weapon. In the meantime, it becomes critically important for senior US officials to continue to communicate clear “red lines”
of unacceptable actions to those rational actors in Tehran. President
Obama’s observable and measurable policy objective of preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapon while eschewing calls for broader
regime change in Iran or adopting the much more amorphous goal of
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability is a positive
step in this direction.

Myth 2: Iran is an existential threat to Israel.
This is a claim frequently accepted at face value in many American
circles, but is vigorously debated in Israel. Israel is widely assessed to
have several hundred nuclear bombs with the capability to deliver them
anywhere in the region, and is demonstrably the region’s strongest and
most capable military power. Admitting to this basic reality, Ephraim
Halevy, former Mossad Director, noted, “I think Israel is strong enough
to protect itself, to take care of itself. I think ultimately it is not in the
power of Iran to destroy the state of Israel.”12 Similarly, Dan Halutz,
8     General Martin Dempsey, “Martin Dempsey on Syria, Iran and China,” interview with
Fareed Zakaria, Fareed Zakaria GPS, February 17, 2012, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.
com/2012/02/17/watch-gps-martin-dempsey-on-syria-iran-and-china.
9     Meir Dagan, “Ex-Mossad Chief: Iran rational; Don’t attack now,” CBS News, interview
by Lesley Stahl, March 9, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57393715/
ex-mossad-chief-iran-rational-dont-attack-now.
10     “Israeli Official Doubts Iran Would Nuke His Country,” USA Today, February 26, 2010,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-02-26-israel-iran-nuclear_N.htm.
11     James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Testimony
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 7, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20
Reports/2013%20ATA%20SFR%20for%20SSCI%2012%20Mar%20213.pdf.
12     “Iran Poses No ‘Existential Threat’ to Israel,” RT News, February 6, 2012, http://rt.com.
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former Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff, has concluded that “Iran
poses a serious threat but not an existential one.”13
Busting both of these aforementioned myths allows policymakers
and intelligence analysts to develop a more honest assessment of both the
scale and urgency of any potential threat from Iran to either US or Israeli
interests. For now, Iran is a middling regional military power with limited
capability to threaten its neighbors. Furthermore, any Iranian attack on
American or Israeli interests could be met quickly with a devastating
blow from the superior conventional and unconventional military might
of either the United States or Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran would change
these calculations somewhat, but primarily by providing Iran a meaningful deterrent to a massive military intervention designed to overturn the
regime in Tehran—something for which neither the American public
nor the Obama administration would likely have any appetite.
At the same time, dismissing these myths does not mean that Iran
has not or will not aggressively compete with the United States and Israel
for regional influence. US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
eliminated two of Iran’s major regional competitors and have consequently provided Tehran a relative advantage. The misnamed “Arab
Spring” has dislodged important American allies and created regional
instability that Iran will undoubtedly seek to exploit to its own advantage.
Iran will continue to foster its relationships with Hezbollah in South
Lebanon and Syria; Shi’a political leaders and local militia forces in Iraq;
Shi’a communities in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf; and Hamas
in Gaza as a means of extending its own influence at the expense of
American and Israeli interests. However, such strategic gamesmanship
is not unique to Iran and virtually every player in the competitive game
of international politics seeks to extend leverage over other parties. It is
worth recalling modern Iran has no history of invading its neighbors.
Iran has thus far pressed its advantages primarily by exploiting its “soft
power” relationships with regional Shi’a groups and by seeking asymmetric advantages through financing, training, and equipping nonstate
actors such as Hezbollah (and more recently the Asad regime in Syria)
as a counter to the superior conventional military forces of the United
States and Israel.

Myth 3: Iranian civilian nuclear activities are a cover for nuclear weapons
program.
This charge has been repeatedly dismissed by the best available US
intelligence assessments. The 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate
assessed Iran suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Then
Secretary of Defense Panetta confirmed the continued validity of
this assessment in February 2013 saying, “the intelligence we have is
they [Iranian leaders] have not made the decision to proceed with the
development of a nuclear weapon.”14 Instead, the ultimate objective for
Iran’s civilian nuclear program, according to US Director of National
13      Gil Ronen, “Former IDF Head Halutz: Iran Threat ‘Not Existential’,” Arutz Sheva, February
2, 2012, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/152382.
14     Leon Panetta, Meet the Press, interview of February 3, 2013, http://
w w w. n b c n e w s . c o m / i d / 5 0 6 6 6 1 6 8 / n s / m e e t _ t h e _ p r e s s - t r a n s c r i p t s / t /
february-leon-panetta-martin-dempsey-robert-gibbs-ralph-redd-ana-navarro-david-brooks.
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Intelligence James Clapper, may be to develop “various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose
to do so.”15 He went on, however, to emphasize that “we do not know
. . . if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”16 In other
words, Iran (like several other countries) may be seeking a latent nuclear
capability or what is often referred to as the “Japan option”—the ability
to produce a nuclear weapon on a relatively compressed timeline should
the security situation warrant a nuclear deterrent. It is in this sense that
repeated US and Israeli threats to attack Iran’s existing civilian nuclear
facilities may well be counterproductive by underscoring the potential
need for just such a deterrent. In fact, Britain’s former Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw recently explained that the veiled military threat of keeping all
options on the table “is a hindrance to negotiations, rather than a help.”17
Finally, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has formally
and publicly renounced nuclear weapons in a binding religious ruling
or fatwa that “considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin.”
Reversing such a pledge is, of course, not impossible. However, all available evidence confirms that Khamenei has thus far made good on his
pledge to “never pursue nuclear weapons.”

Myth 4: Iran has sufficient nuclear fuel to make a bomb.
This claim has been advanced by sloppy analysts and others interested in hyping the urgency of an Iranian nuclear threat. However, there
is no evidence Iran has produced any weapons-grade fissile material.
All publicly available evidence suggests Iran is producing low enriched
uranium at roughly the 5 percent and 20 percent levels (for energy production and medical treatments), but not to the 90 percent level required
for weapons-grade fissile material. Moreover, while Iran is openly
increasing its capacity to produce more of this low enriched uranium
with additional centrifuges, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in February and May verified Iran is simultaneously converting
some of its enriched uranium to fuel stocks thereby reducing the amount
of fissionable material potentially available for a nuclear bomb.18 Iran
is, therefore, deliberately limiting the amount of its enriched uranium
stocks below that required for a nuclear bomb.

15     James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Testimony before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, January 31, 2012), 5, http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf.
16     Ibid. This same language is repeated verbatim in the 2013 “Worldwide Threat Assessment”
available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf, page 3.
17     Jack Straw, “Even if Iran Gets the Bomb, It Won’t be Worth Going to War,” The Telegraph,
February 25, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9892742/Even-if-Iran-gets-theBomb-it-wont-be-worth-going-to-war.html.
18     Fredrik Dahl, “U.N. Report May Show Slower Growth in Iran Nuclear Stockpile,” Reuters,
February 20, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/us-nuclear-iran-iaea-idUSBRE91J1AH20130220; Frederik Dahl, "Iran acts to Expand Sensitive Nuclear Capacity," Reuters, 21 May 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/21/us-iran-nuclear-iaea-idUSBRE94K0LI20130521.
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Myth 5: Iran is on the brink of producing a nuclear weapon.
US, Israeli, and other western intelligence agencies have been predicting an imminent Iranian nuclear bomb since 1979. A Christian Science
Monitor article summarizes the lengthy history of these assessments:
Breathless predictions that the Islamic Republic will soon be at the brink
of nuclear capability, or—worse—acquire an actual nuclear bomb, are not
new. For more than a quarter of a century Western officials have claimed
repeatedly that Iran is close to joining the nuclear club. Such a result is
always declared ‘unacceptable’ and a possible reason for military action, with
‘all options on the table’ to prevent upsetting the Mideast strategic balance
dominated by the U.S. and Israel. And yet, those predictions have time and
again come and gone.19

This long and inconvenient trail of errant predictions is not likely to
persuade those who are absolutely convinced Iran is bent on acquiring
nuclear weapons. After all, in Aesop’s fable The Boy Who Cried Wolf, the
wolf is real and it does attack the shepherd’s flock. However, equally
plausible explanations for the fact that Iran has thus far failed to acquire
a nuclear weapons capability include: (a) Iran has no intent of doing
so; or (b) existing policies, sanctions, and other activities including suspected covert operations (assassinating Iranian scientists and infecting
Iran’s nuclear facilities with computer viruses) have effectively deterred,
delayed, or prevented Iran from producing a nuclear weapon.

Myth 6: Iran’s enrichment activities are a violation of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).
One could readily find talented lawyers who persuasively argue either
side of this case. Former Secretary of State Clinton publicly claimed Iran
violated the terms of the NPT. However, the international watchdog
responsible for monitoring nuclear developments stops short of describing Iranian actions as a formal violation of its NPT obligations.
The confusion on this score is a direct result of the ambiguity of the
deal struck by the NPT and deserves an extended treatment here since
these divergent interpretations of the treaty explain the essence of the
current disagreements between Iran and the P5+1.
Article IV of the NPT explicitly states, “Nothing in this Treaty
shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties
to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with
articles I and II of this Treaty.” This article provides the statutory basis
for Iran’s insistence any negotiated outcome must, as a minimum, recognize Iran’s unquestionable right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes.
Recent polling suggests the Iranian public continues to endorse this
view despite the current pain of sanctions.20
19     Scott Peterson, “Imminent Iran Nuclear Threat? A Timeline of Warnings Since 1979,” The
Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com.
20     Mohamed Younis, “Iranians Feel Bite of Sanctions, Blame U.S., Not Own Leaders: Most
Support Nuclear Program Despite Sanction,” Gallup World, February 7, 2013, http://www.gallup.
com.
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However, Article III of the NPT simultaneously requires nonnuclear-weapons states to also accept safeguards as negotiated by the IAEA
to verify and prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons. US negotiators can cite this article and Iran’s failure
to comply fully with IAEA demands as a basis for claiming Iran has
violated the NPT. Moreover, the IAEA does expressly criticize Iran for
failing to implement its Additional Protocol. This bilateral agreement
was negotiated between the IAEA and Iran in 2003 and provided for
more stringent safeguards including expanded access by IAEA inspectors to nuclear facilities beyond the original terms of the NPT. Iran
suspended its implementation in 2005 to protest continued sanctions
despite its cooperation with the Additional Protocol.
So who has the better side of the argument? On balance, Iranian
nuclear activities appear largely consistent with its NPT obligations,
although Tehran could do more to remove existing doubts about prior
activities and improve transparency with IAEA inspectors. The latest
formal IAEA report on Iran never uses the word violate in assessing Iran’s
compliance with the NPT. In fact, repeated IAEA reports specifically
explain “the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared
material.”21 Additionally, the IAEA continues to actively monitor and
inspect Iran’s declared nuclear facilities with a system of installed cameras
and through physical on-site inspection teams. The IAEA report of
22 May 2013 expressly confirms that "all of these [enrichment related
activities] are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material,
installed cascades, and the feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance." In other words,
after literally thousands of hours of international inspections there is absolutely no
evidence that Iran is diverting enriched uranium for a weapons program.
More recently, disputes over IAEA access to an Iranian military
facility at Parchin have added to international concerns about a lack of
full transparency. These conditions, along with Iran’s suspension of the
Additional Protocols, have left the IAEA ultimately unable to provide
credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material.
These uncertainties provide the immediate basis for recent UN Security
Council resolutions sanctioning Iran.
This situation is eerily reminiscent of that confronting international
inspectors and Iraq in the aftermath of Desert Storm throughout the
1990s. At the conclusion of this war, the United Nations demanded the
disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and created an international inspections regime (the United Nations Special Commission
and its successor United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission) to ensure the destruction of Iraq’s chemical and biological
weapons and to coordinate with the IAEA to eliminate Iraqi nuclear
weapons facilities. Although much verifiable progress was made in
dismantling Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stocks and facilities, there were disagreements between Iraqi officials and international
inspectors over the extent and degree of access required. These frictions
21     International Atomic Energy Agency, Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Vienna, Austria:
International Atomic Energy Agency, February 21, 2013), 12, http://www.iaea.org; http://www.
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-6.pdf. This assessment was confirmed
in the IAEA's report of 22 May 2013, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/
gov2013-27.pdf.
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multiplied over time and resulted in occasional stand-offs as inspectors
were delayed or altogether denied permission to enter certain sensitive
facilities. These delays and obstructions were used as justification for
both imposing increasingly harsh sanctions and for limited bombing
attacks by the United States and Britain in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox).
It was this lack of transparency and what came to be characterized as
a cynical game of “cat and mouse” between Saddam and inspectors
that ultimately provided the rationale for the American invasion of Iraq
in 2003. US leaders and intelligence officials assumed Iraq’s failure to
cooperate in the face of stringent sanctions could only indicate Saddam
was actively maintaining WMD stockpiles that would eventually target
American interests. In hindsight, of course, we know that the combination of international inspections and sanctions had effectively contained
Saddam and prevented him from reconstituting his WMD programs.
The present IAEA stand-off with Iran over access to Parchin is
a close parallel with the situation of Iraq in the 1990s. International
inspectors are demanding renewed access to a facility within the Parchin
military compound based on unattributed intelligence claiming that
Iran at one time conducted nuclear tests with possible military dimensions. Iran has denied the IAEA access noting that IAEA inspectors
had conducted a successful visit to the facility in 2005 without incident.
Iran further asserts this complex has no connection to nuclear programs
and is used only for conventional military purposes. Without renewed
access, however, the IAEA argues it cannot confidently conclude that
Iran is not conducting illicit nuclear activities. Essentially, this places
Iran in the extremely difficult position of having to prove a negative. In
other words, it is not enough that the IAEA finds no concrete evidence
of illicit nuclear weapons activities. Instead, Iran must provide the IAEA
unrestricted and immediate access to any and all Iranian facilities for an
undetermined amount of time before the IAEA will give Iran anything
resembling a clean bill of health. Of course, it is precisely the extent of
the cooperation required of Iran that has been and will continue to be
the focus of ongoing negotiations with the IAEA and P5+1. US policymakers must decide what levels of uncertainty regarding Iran’s nuclear
activities they are willing to tolerate. Iran is simply unlikely to provide
international inspectors carte blanche to inspect everywhere at any time.
Finally, Iranian leaders make use of these disagreements over NPT
obligations to attack US policies as imposing a double standard that
unfairly targets Iran. Leaders in Tehran frequently point out that while
the United States is leading the charge to punish Iran for its [peaceful
civilian] nuclear activities, America simultaneously offers substantial
military, economic, and political support to nuclear-armed states such
as Israel, India, and Pakistan who are not signatories to the NPT and
do not allow international inspections of their nuclear facilities. This
apparent double standard fuels concern among Iranian politicians
that America’s true aim is to curb Iranian power and to foster internal
domestic dissent that will ultimately lead to the overthrow of the current
regime in Tehran. These leaders also observe that several other countries
with advanced civilian nuclear programs, including Argentina, Brazil,
Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Syria, and Venezuela, refused to agree to the
Additional Protocols; however, these countries are not subjected to the
same rigorous scrutiny as Iran.
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Questionable Assumptions About the Consequences of a
Nuclear-Armed Iran

Beyond these misleading myths about Iran and the current state of
its nuclear activities, American policymakers would be well advised to
examine fully all assertions about the potential consequences of Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons. The net effect of these dubious assumptions is a worst-case analysis that exaggerates the likely consequences
of a nuclear-armed Iran and thus increases prospects for an American
overreaction leading to military confrontation.

Assumption # 1: A nuclear-armed Iran will lead to regional proliferation.
While it is possible that a nuclear-armed Iran could spur other
regional countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own, policymakers should not simply assume this will be the case. Recent analysis by the
Center for New American Security challenges “conventional wisdom that
Iranian nuclearization will spark region-wide proliferation,” observes
that historical cases of reactive proliferation are “exceedingly rare,” and
ultimately concludes that “neither Egypt nor Turkey, [nor Saudi Arabia]
is likely to respond . . . by pursuing the bomb.”22 A recent study from
the War Studies Department of King’s College London draws similar
conclusions noting Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia “have little to gain
and much to lose by embarking down such a route.”23 Moreover, there
is ample historical evidence both inside and outside the Middle East
that one nation’s possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily
lead to further proliferation among presumed competitors. For instance,
China conducted its first nuclear weapons tests in 1964 and neither
Japan nor South Korea have yet opted to “go-nuclear” although both
countries certainly have long possessed the technical capability to do so.
Ironically, the most powerful incentive for nuclear proliferation among
Arab nations has been Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons capability
since the late 1960s. Nevertheless, despite several Arab-Israeli wars,
neither Iran nor any Arab state has developed nuclear weapons in the
subsequent 50 years. Finally, there are any number of deliberate actions
US policymakers could take to minimize prospects for further regional
proliferation including providing friendly militaries with capable defensive missile systems and perhaps even extending America’s nuclear
umbrella to threatened allies.

Assumption #2: A nuclear-armed Iran will destabilize the region
As with the previous assumption, the prospect of further destabilization of the region in the wake of Iran’s development of a nuclear
weapon cannot be ruled out. However, Kenneth Waltz, a prominent
American international relations scholar, in a recent provocative Foreign
Affairs article entitled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” makes precisely
22     Colin Kahl, Melissa G. Dalton, and Matthew Irvine, Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb,
Will Saudi Arabia Be Next? (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, February 2013),
7, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf.
23     Straw, “Even if Iran Gets the Bomb, It Won’t be Worth Going to War.”
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the opposite argument.24 Waltz argues the overwhelming preponderance
of historical evidence suggests nuclear weapons have been a stabilizing
influence on international politics imposing a tremendous degree of
rationality and caution on the part of nuclear powers. The most obvious
case in point: The US-USSR nuclear arsenals contributed to what diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis aptly dubbed The Long Peace—a
period of history uniquely characterized by the absence of violent conflict
between the major powers. Indeed, since the advent of nuclear weapons
there has not been a single major armed confrontation between nuclear
powers. The same logic would likely apply to Israel and Iran.

Assumption #3: A nuclear-armed Iran will destroy the global nonproliferation
regime.
There is little doubt that the immediate impact of Iran becoming
a member of the nuclear club would represent a setback to global nonproliferation efforts. However, it would be a huge distortion to suggest
this single event would cause the collapse of the entire nonproliferation
enterprise. By any reasonable historic measure, international nonproliferation efforts have been successful. In his third presidential debate with
Nixon in 1960, John F. Kennedy predicted that “10, 15, or 20 nations
will have a nuclear capacity . . . by the end of the Presidential office in
1964.” Despite this alarming prediction, only 9 nations currently possess
a nuclear weapons arsenal (Britain, China, France, Russia, United States,
Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea). Not a perfect record over the
span of more than 50 years, but a substantial record of accomplishment
nonetheless. The addition of Iran would not upset this remarkable record.

Implications

Taken as a whole, the foregoing analysis strongly suggests there is
room for a diplomatic resolution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programs.
Official US intelligence estimates indicate Iran suspended its nuclear
weapons research program in 2003. Top US officials have publicly
underscored their assessment that Iranian leaders have not yet made
a decision to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Iran’s Supreme
Leader has issued a binding religious fatwa declaring the possession of
nuclear weapons is a grave sin against Islam. In the meantime, international inspectors remain active at all of Iran’s declared nuclear sites and
continue to verify enriched uranium is not being diverted to military purposes. All of these indications suggest there is a window of opportunity
to convince Tehran to accept effective limits on its nuclear ambitions in
return for a meaningful easing (and eventual lifting) of sanctions.
Just how long this window of opportunity will last is open to debate.
Nevertheless, the long trail of erroneous assessments by Western intelligence services reaching as far back as 1979 that Iran will soon possess
a nuclear weapon should cause policymakers to approach present-day
alarmist calls with a high degree of skepticism. In any event, there is
more to developing and deploying a nuclear weapon than assembling a
sufficient number of centrifuges to produce an ample quantity of highly
24     Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean
Stability,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/August 2012): 2-5.
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enriched uranium. According to a recent analysis by several former
senior US officials and national security professionals, Iran would need
several months to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for even
a single bomb and then “up to two years, according to conservative
estimates, would be required for Iran to build a nuclear warhead that
would be reliably deliverable by a missile.”25 The report further observes
these activities would likely be detected by US intelligence providing
policymakers a month or more to respond. The US Director of National
Intelligence recently confirmed the ability of the intelligence community to give policymakers advance warning noting, “we assess Iran could
not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU
[weapons-grade uranium] before this activity is discovered.”26
Clearly, there is time—perhaps years—to fashion a negotiated
solution that serves both American and Iranian interests. The essential
outlines of a negotiated deal are well known. The United States will
need to recognize formally Iran’s right to enrich uranium while Iran will
have to limit its enrichment activities and agree to an intrusive regimen
of international inspections (something along the lines called for in the
Additional Protocol previously agreed to in 2003 by both Iran and the
IAEA) in exchange for the graduated lifting of sanctions.
As with any negotiation, the devil resides in the details. For the
United States, however, a successful deal in the near term offers the best
prospect Iran will willingly remain a nonnuclear weapons state. Serious
negotiations now would take full advantage of the current international
consensus behind sanctions—a consensus that history suggests will
likely only fray over time. A diplomatic solution would also avoid the dangerous pitfalls of military strikes against widely dispersed, and in many
cases well protected, Iranian nuclear facilities. Many military analysts are
convinced these attacks would at best only delay Iran’s nuclear programs
for two years or so while simultaneously strengthening the position of
hardliners in Iran and bolstering their conviction that Iran desperately
needs a nuclear deterrent against future military attacks.27 For Iran, a
negotiated resolution would ease the burden of sanctions and offer some
degree of validation by the international community of nations.
US policymakers should also thoroughly scrutinize many of the
worst-case assumptions about a nuclear-armed Iran. Disastrous outcomes
are not preordained. In any case, the most significant of these could be
mitigated through existing diplomatic, informational, economic, and
military instruments. Allegations that other regional states will respond to
a nuclear Iran by seeking their own nuclear weapons capability have been
refuted by recent analyses. States have many reasons to eschew nuclear
weapons (that is why only nine states have chosen to do possess them)
and smart US policies could amplify those costs (sanctions) and provide
additional political and military incentives to reassure threatened allies
so they do not feel the need for an independent nuclear weapons capability. Policymakers should also derive comfort from knowing the history
of the Cold War demonstrates that, by virtue of their massive destructive
25     Austin Long and William Luers, Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran
(New York: The Iran Project, 2012), 9, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
IranReport_091112_FINAL.pdf.
26     Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (2013), 7.
27     For an example of this analysis, see Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran.
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power and the horrific scale of likely retribution, nuclear weapons are far
more likely to impose a stronger sense of rationality and caution on states
than they are to encourage reckless aggressive military action.
Finally, even as policymakers remain fully committed to a policy of
prevention, they would be well advised to recognize that containment
and deterrence remain viable strategic options should prevention fail.
Iranian leaders have proven themselves to be rational actors primarily concerned with securing their own physical and political survival.
Deterrence and containment successfully achieved US interests when
confronting ugly, violent, and dictatorial leaders in Moscow and Beijing.
There is little reason to suspect artful US strategy could not achieve
similar results vis-a-vis a nuclear-armed Iran.

